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Abstract 
Private school choice programs often are accused of failing to serve disadvantaged 
students. Critics claim that participating private schools “skim the cream off the top” by 
admitting only the best students and “push out” students who are the most difficult to teach. This 
study tests these student selection hypotheses in the context of the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program (LSP). We find LSP applicants are less advantaged than their public school peers 
regarding their family socioeconomic status and initial test scores. No consistent evidence 
indicates that the LSP private schools are “skimming the cream” or “pushing out” students based 
on their family social status or initial test scores. However, students with disabilities are less 
likely than students without disabilities to use a voucher initially. Students who were placed in 
LSP private schools that were farther from their homes or that serve a larger minority population 
are more likely to leave their LSP schools than LSP students placed in schools closer to their 
homes or that serve smaller minority populations. LSP students with better educational resources 
in their residential public school district are more likely to leave the LSP than students with 
worse educational resources. Finally, the LSP students still using vouchers after three years are 
more likely to have a low family income, more likely to be African American, and more likely to 
be female than the population of non-applicants to the program.  
 
Keywords: school choice, school movement, cream skimming, student selectivity, 
survival model
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DO YOU GET CREAM WITH YOUR CHOICE? CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS 
WHO MOVED INTO OR OUT OF THE LOUISIANA SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 
  
In the U.S., some education policy analysts recommend school choice programs as 
remedies for a public education system perceived to be ineffective. Supporters of school choice 
programs state that such programs will help improve student educational achievement, especially 
for those who come from disadvantaged backgrounds, by (1) providing access to objectively 
better schools and (2) allowing parents to choose the school which is most suitable for their child 
(DeAngelis & Erickson, 2018; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman,1962, 1955). 
Critics, on the other hand, argue that choice programs lure the best students away from 
current public schools, which results in a negative “cream skimming” effect that disadvantages 
those who remain behind (Altonji, Huang, & Taber, 2015). Even when program applicants are 
admitted to choice-schools under random lotteries, relatively disadvantaged students tend to be 
“pushed out” of choice programs at a disproportionally higher rate than their more advantaged 
peers, critics claim (Mincberg, 2003). “Cream skimming” and “pushing out” threaten the equity 
goals of expanded parental school choice. 
This perceived selection issue also raises concerns when interpreting the effects of choice 
programs. Lottery-based school choice evaluations are the most appealing approach to estimating 
the true effects of a school choice program (Pirog, 2014; Wolf et al., 2013; Boruch, Moya, & 
Snyder, 2002). Random assignment enables researchers to obtain unbiased program effects 
simply by comparing the average outcomes of the treatment and control groups. However, 
families can self-select out of a choice program by either declining to use it when it is offered or 
by leaving the choice school after initially attending. Such self-selections violate the “random” 
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assumption of field experiments (Barnard et al. 2003) thus challenging the internal validity of 
program evaluation. Though conservative approaches such as intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis and 
econometric techniques like Instrument Variable (IV) or Complier Average Causal Effect 
(CACE) models account for selection and therefore preserve the internal validity of experiments, 
the fact that program effects on non-compliers are never actually observed limits the external 
validity of the results (e.g. Cowen, 2008; Howell & Peterson 2006).  
A systematic pattern of program attrition also could indicate that the program is not 
serving a targeted student population. Policy makers want to know if an intervention is serving 
key subgroups of students and for whom such an intervention is most promising. Knowledge 
about program non-compliers also signals potential barriers that are preventing targeted families 
from fully participating in the program. 
As school choice programs proliferate and expand, student selection issues are 
particularly important. So far, evidence from small-scale privately-funded voucher programs in 
Charlotte (NC), Cleveland (OH), New York City (NY), and publicly-funded voucher programs 
in Milwaukee (WI), Washington (DC) and Ohio provide informative yet inconsistent patterns of 
program “cream skimming” and the “pushing out” of students based on their demographics 
(Figlio & Karbownik, 2016; Fleming et al., 2015; Figlio, 2014; Carlson et al., 2013; Cowen et 
al., 2012; Cowen, 2010; Figlio, Hart, & Metzger, 2010; Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006; 
Campbell et al., 2005; Howell, 2004; Rouse, 1998). There is little evidence of consistency in the 
patterns of students’ participation in private school choice programs, demographically and 
institutionally. 
This study identifies which factors influence students’ participation in the first three years 
of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP): school years 2012-13 to 2014-15. The LSP is one 
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of the nation’s first statewide private school choice programs that offers publicly funded 
vouchers to cover private school tuition for students from low-income families whose children 
previously attended low-performing public schools. Initially established in 2008 as a pilot 
program in New Orleans, the LSP was expanded statewide in the 2012-13 school year. LSP 
placements are based on school-grade level lotteries while first accounting for student priorities. 
We specifically examine what factors predict students’ applying to the LSP, participating 
students’ self-selecting out of the program by declining to use a voucher offered to them, and 
students’ withdrawing from the LSP. Factors examined include student demographics, specific 
attributes of assigned private schools, residential school district educational resources, and the 
institutional attributes of the public schools students attended during the baseline year prior to 
applying to the LSP.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the research literature on 
student participation patterns in private school choice programs in the U.S., followed by a 
description of the subject of our study, the LSP. We then present our research methodology, 
including the data and analytical strategy we use in this study. The following section presents the 
main findings. Our final section concludes with policy implications. 
Prior Studies on Student Participation in Private School Choice Programs 
Empirical studies have examined student participation in voucher and voucher-type 
scholarship programs that target disadvantaged students in Charlotte (NC), Florida, Milwaukee 
(WI), Ohio, New York City (NY), and Washington (DC).  
Most voucher programs have been targeted to students coming from low-income 
families, students with disabilities, or students with other disadvantages. The New York City 
voucher program, funded privately by the School Choice Scholarship Foundation (SCSF), had a 
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greater proportion of African American applicants and a lower non-Hispanic white population, 
as well as a larger proportion of welfare recipients, in the applicant group than in the non-
applicant group (Howell, 2004). Students with disabilities, who were African American, or who 
were enrolled in the Free/Reduced price Lunch program applied to the DC Opportunity 
Scholarship Program in numbers that exceeded their share of the DC school population (Wolf, 
Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006). In the privately-funded national Children’s Scholarship Fund (CSF) 
program, Campbell, West, and Peterson (2005) found that African American and Hispanic 
parents, as well as mothers with higher levels of education, tended to have a higher likelihood of 
applying for the voucher when compared to non-applicants.  
Voucher programs targeted to low-income families may vary in the rates at which 
students actually use their vouchers. In New York City’s SCSP, nearly 26% of students declined 
to use their vouchers to attend private schools during the program’s first year (Howell, 2004). 
The decline rates were similar in other privately funded programs such as the Children’s 
Scholarship Fund (CSF) in Charlotte, NC, where 24% of the voucher lottery winners declined to 
use a voucher initially (Cowen, 2010). In the first federally funded voucher program in 
Washington, DC, 25% of the lottery winners failed to use a voucher in the first year (Wolf, 
Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006). 
Who are those decliners? No consistent “cream skimming” has been found across these 
programs based on student test scores.Evidence from New York (Howell, 2004); Washington, 
DC (Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006); and Ohio (Figlio & Karbownik, 2016) suggests that 
relatively low-achieving students are more likely to decline an awarded voucher, while Florida 
(Hart, 2014; Figlio, Hart, & Metzger, 2010) presents evidence of higher-performing students 
being less likely to use the voucher-type tax-credits to attend private schools.  
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Student demographics also predict voucher usage. Males, African Americans, Hispanics, 
and students with special educational needs are more likely to decline a voucher when offered 
(Fleming et al., 2013; Cowen, 2010; Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006; Campbell, West, & 
Peterson, 2005; Howell, 2004). Lower socioeconomic status, which includes families with a 
lower household income, a lower maternal educational level, and a larger family size, tends to 
increase the likelihood of students declining a voucher award (Fleming et al., 2013; Wolf, Eissa, 
& Gutmann, 2006; Howell, 2004). Meanwhile, voucher decliners in the DC Opportunity 
Scholarship Program (DC OSP) and the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) tend to 
have higher residential stability (Fleming et al., 2013; Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006). Location 
is also an important consideration for voucher usage, as parents who decline vouchers in New 
York City, Dayton (OH), and Washington (DC) claim the inconvenient locations of preferred 
private schools are a barrier to utilize the voucher (Howell et al., 2006). 
Few scholars have examined the effects of public school resources on persuading 
students to decline a voucher. Campbell, West, and Peterson (2005) find that the attributes of a 
student’s residential school district appear to influence school choice decisions. Students from 
districts with higher proportions of minority students, lower educational expenditures, and lower 
private school density tend to be more likely to decline to use a voucher. 
Students also can opt out of a school choice program after initially using a voucher. 
Descriptively, there is substantial evidence that students who attend private schools using a 
voucher tend to opt out at high annual rates. In Milwaukee, the program attrition rate has ranged 
from 22% to 35% every year (Carlson et al., 2013; Cowen et al., 2012; Rouse, 1998). In New 
York City, this rate has been about 22% annually (Howell, 2004). In the most recent statewide 
voucher program, the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program, 16.3% of the voucher users exited 
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the program after the first year (Waddington & Berends, 2018). The private school attrition rates 
in voucher programs are similar to student mobility rates in public schools. The Institute of 
Medicine and National Research Council (2010) reported that in 1998 roughly 33% of 4th 
graders, 20% of 8th graders, and 10% of 12th graders had changed schools at least once in the 
previous two years, and this rate is generally high in large urban districts populated 
disproportionally by minority students. 
Studies of students who stop attending private schools in choice programs present a clear 
pattern. Students who struggle in private schools academically leave the program at higher rates 
(Figlio et al., 2014; Carlson et al., 2013; Cowen et al., 2012; Rouse, 1998). Students who exit 
private school choice programs are more likely to be minorities, in higher grade levels (Carlson 
et al., 2013; Cowen et al., 2012; Howell, 2004;), with lower residential stability (Howell, 2004), 
and lower family income (Cowen et al. 2012; Howell, 2004; Rouse, 1998) than students who 
persist in the programs. These attrition characteristics also describe students with educationally 
disadvantaged backgrounds who were originally targeted by the programs. Cowen et al. (2012) 
further find that students who previously attended private schools with a larger share of minority 
students or voucher students tend to have a higher likelihood of returning to the public education 
system. 
In sum, students who come from disadvantaged families tend to be more likely to apply 
for private school vouchers, however, even among applicants, relatively disadvantaged are more 
likely to decline a voucher once offered. Even after accepting the voucher, these students are 
more likely to transfer back to public schools. No consistent evidence on school cream skimming 
based on test scores has been found. However, lower-achieving students face a greater risk of 
leaving private school choice programs. We do not know if these patterns of voucher declining 
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and voucher program attrition exist because more disadvantaged students are somehow 
prevented from attending private schools, “counseled out” of them once they are there, or 
voluntarily leave the program. It is at least possible that some families, both disadvantaged and 
advantaged, have a higher preference for public schooling even when the opportunity for private 
schooling is offered to them or after personally experiencing private schooling. 
Background: The Case of the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
Currently, 30 states and the District of Colombia have adopted at least one private school 
choice program (EdChoice, 2019). Most of these choice programs are limited to urban areas or to 
students with disabilities. The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is one of the first statewide 
private school choice programs that offers publicly funded vouchers to cover private school 
tuition for students from low-income families who previously attended low-performing public 
schools. Initially established in 2008 as a pilot program in New Orleans, the LSP was expanded 
to a statewide program during the 2012-13 school year. Students with a family income of less 
than 250% of the federal poverty line who are entering kindergarten or who previously attended 
public schools graded C, D, or F1 are eligible for LSP vouchers. In the first year of program 
expansion, 2012-13, 41% of the K-12 student population was eligible for this voucher program, 
9,809 eligible students applied for the scholarship, and 5,771 of them (0.82% of the K-12 student 
population) received a voucher worth on average $5,242. The voucher amount is 90% of the 
combined state and local foundation aid to the student or the tuition amount charged by the 
chosen private school, whichever is less.  
                                                 
1 School Grades in Louisiana’s school accountability system at baseline year (2011-12). 
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Several features differentiate the LSP from most other voucher programs. Private schools 
must accept the LSP voucher amount as the full cost of educating the child and cannot require 
that parents “top-up” the voucher value. Further, eligible students are assigned the voucher for a 
specific grade in a particular school under a lottery mechanism accounting for their service 
priorities. Specifically, students with disabilities and “multiple birth siblings” (e.g. twins or 
triplets) automatically receive a scholarship if there is an available space at their preferred 
school. Finally, participating LSP private schools cannot apply admission standards to voucher 
students based on their family socio-economic status or test scores. These factors limit the 
schools’ ability to enroll students selectively. 
Applicants to the LSP can list up to five private schools on a tiered preference in their 
application. This design feature could increase parents’ probability of taking up the voucher 
because its award coincides with placement in a school requested by the parents, often their first-
or second-choice school (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Roth, 2005; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005). 
Students in Louisiana tend to have many schooling options. The charter school sector is 
large in Louisiana, especially in the urban areas of New Orleans and Baton Rouge (Wolf & 
Lasserre-Cortez, 2018). Various public school choice programs, including magnet schools and 
charter schools, pre-dated the LSP and enrolled 30% of LSP applicants. Nearly 20% of K-12 
students in the state pay tuition to attend private schools. Since parents in Louisiana have more 
schooling options, we may expect higher decliner and attrition rates in the LSP, compared to 
other voucher programs, especially in the districts with a higher density of charter and magnet 
schools. 
Lastly, studies reveal that the private schools participating in the LSP tend to be below 
average in school quality. Only one-third of the private schools in Louisiana enroll LSP students. 
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Those LSP schools tend to have lower tuition costs and smaller enrollments than the average 
Louisiana private school, both of which are indicators of lower quality schools (Sude, 
DeAngelis, & Wolf, 2018). Further, Mills and Wolf (2017) show that voucher-awarded students 
fell significantly behind their peers academically in public schools during the first two years of 
the program; however, this difference became statistically null by the third year. This pattern 
suggests that the private schools participating in the LSP failed to improve student academic 
achievement, especially for the first two years. Thus, we expect many LSP students to have made 
a strategic move to leave the program before the third year, especially those from relatively more 
advantaged families who are better able to obtain a quality education for their children. 
This study aims to further the literature about student participation in voucher programs 
by analyzing student participation patterns during the first three years of the LSP. We test for 
systematic initial cream skimming or later attrition based on student demographics, family 
backgrounds, and test scores. 
Data and Sample 
The data we analyze come from the LSP eligible applicant, Student Information System 
(SIS), and State Assessment files. The Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) provided these 
student-level restricted use files according to our data agreement with the state. 
Data description 
The major outcome of interest of our study is student voucher usage status in the 
Louisiana Scholarship Program. We obtained this information from the LSP eligible applicant 
file. Voucher usage status is tracked by fiscal quarters2 and a student is recorded as “1” in quarter 
                                                 
2 For instance, in school year 2012-2013, Quarter 1 denotes the time period of July, August, and September 2012, 
Quarter 2 denotes the time period of October, November, and December 2012, Quarter 3 denotes the time period of 
January, February, and March 2013, and Quarter 4 denotes the time period of April, May, and Jun 2013. 
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Q for usage if she or he has used the voucher to attend a private school in Louisiana during Q. 
The LSP eligible applicant file also provides information on student individual demographics, 
such as gender, ethnicity, and grade level; eligible applicant’s school choice list; and lottery 
placement in the baseline year. Since parents were not required to report their household income 
and educational levels for application, we obtained the Neighborhood Average Household 
Income3 associated with the applicant’s zip code to proxy for family socio-economic status 
(SES).  
Student movement among Louisiana schools is another consideration. We obtained this 
information from the Student Information System (SIS) files for the baseline year of fiscal 2011-
12 through outcome year three in 2014-15. These data provide student enrollment records prior 
to and after participating in the LSP, enabling us to identify if and when a voucher user has 
returned to a public school during the period July 2011 through June 2015.  
We merge our dataset with students’ state assessment records on math achievement from 
the baseline year 2011-12 through 2014-15 to explore if usage patterns are related to student 
annual achievement. Students in Louisiana are required to take state assessments in grades three 
through eight unless excused due to a disability. The exams are criterion-referenced tests that 
align with Louisiana’s state standards. The tests produce scale scores between 100 and 500 with 
a mean of 300 and a standard deviation of 50. To better compare students’ test scores over time 
and grade levels, we convert these scale scores into standardized z scores by grade level. By 
including baseline or current student test scores, we restrict our analytical sample to only 
elementary students in grades three through eight in 2012-13 with test scores. 
                                                 
3 IRS, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Master File System, July 2014.  
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In addition to the data sets provided by the LDE, we also collect information on the 
private schools4 that receive voucher students during school year 2012-13 through 2014-15. The 
private school characteristics include the ethnicity of the student population, school tuition, and 
the number of voucher students enrolled in the first year after statewide program expansion. We 
also estimate the distance between the assigned private school and the student’s home by 
estimating the general distance between school and home zip codes5 to proxy for the 
convenience of attending the lottery-assigned private school.  
For the analyses of voucher usage during the post-lottery period, we restrict our analysis 
to the initial 2012-13 cohort of program applicants and scholarship recipients. Furthermore, we 
assume that parental choices for kindergarteners, who may be entering school for the first time, 
are different from those for students in higher grades. Most of the rising kindergarten students 
lack information about their previous public school attended, since there was none. Therefore, 
we exclude all kindergarten applicants from our analysis. 
Table 1 describes our analytical samples. When the program was launched in the 2012 
school year, 7,747 non-kindergarten students applied for the program, and 4,426 of them were 
offered the voucher that year, among which 3,865 have ever used the voucher to enroll in a 
private school in the next 3 years. By the end of the third year of the program, we observe 1,669 
voucher users in our sample, which includes 527 students who were in grades 3 through 5 in the 
initial application. 
 
                                                 
4 Private School Universe Survey (PSS) (2011-12 and 2013-14). 
5 Zip code distances were obtained from the ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) Distance Database, NBER. 
http://www.nber.org/data/zip-code-distance-database.html 
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Table 1  
 
Sample Description 
Sample Description Counts (N) 
Non-applicants 689,760 
Applicants 7,747 
Offered LSP voucher 4,426 
Ever User (Overall Sample) 3,865 
Ever User (Students in Grades 3 through 5 in 2012) 1,196 
Voucher User in Year 3 (Overall Sample) 1,669 
Voucher User in Year 3 (Students in Grades 3 through 5 in 2012) 527 
Notes: Counts based on non-kindergarten students in the year 2012-13, with and without restricting the sample to 
students in grades 3 through 5 in 2012. 
Student demographics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the students’ demographics and 
characteristics of the public schools they previously attended. Voucher awardees are 
overwhelmingly African American (88%), in elementary grades (82%), and from traditional 
public schools (TPS) (74%). Only 6% of the awardee-students are classified as having a 
disability, 4% have multi-birth siblings (i.e. twins, triplets, etc.), and 38% previously participated 
in the LSP Pilot program. More than 90% of students awarded scholarships were placed in their 
first-choice schools.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of student characteristics including students’ 
baseline achievement, family background, attributes of their lottery-assigned private schools, and 
the community educational resource of their residential school district. Only 1,953 students have 
baseline test scores, with an average z-score of -0.54, indicating relatively low-achieving 
students in our sample compared to the state population. Students’ family background 
information provided by the scholarship application files merely includes family residential 
address. We connect students’ associated zip codes with the Neighborhood Mean Household 
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Incomes provided by the IRS to proxy for their family socio-economic status. On average, LSP 
awardees’ neighborhood household income in 2012 was around $46,600.  
Table 2 
 
Individual and Baseline School Characteristics of Voucher Awarded Students (2012) 
  Overall Sample  Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
Variable Count %   Count % 
Student Characteristics  (N=4,426)   (N=1,382) 
Female 2,244 50.7  674 48.8 
African American 3,893 88.0  1,228 88.9 
Hispanic 109 2.5  29 2.1 
Caucasian and Other Races 424 9.6  125 9.0 
Special Education Need 270 6.1  102 7.4 
Elementary (Grades 1-6) 3,616 81.7  1,382 100.0 
Middle School (Grades 7-9) 668 15.1  0 0.0 
High School (Grades 10-12) 145 3.2  0 0.0 
Multiple Birth Siblings 175 4.0  41 3.0 
NOLA Participant 1,673 37.8  503 36.4 
Awarded Voucher to 1st Choice School 4,045 91.4  1,262 91.3 
Previously Attended School a (N=2,781)   (N=885) 
Charter School 544 19.6  184 20.8 
Magnet School 175 6.3  40 4.5 
TPS School 2,064 74.1   661 74.7 
Notes: Counts based on non-kindergarten students who were awarded LSP vouchers in the year 2012-13, with and 
without restricting the sample to students in grades 3 through 5 in 2012. a SOURCE: IES-NCES national center for 
education statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD) Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey Data, 
2011-12, LA. 
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Table 3 
 
Family Background, Community Educational Resources, and Awarded Private School 
Characteristics of Voucher Awarded Students (2012) 
  
Overall Sample 
   
Students in Grade 3 
through 5 
  Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev.   Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Student Achievement at the Base Line        
Math Achievement 1,953 -0.54 0.94  1,323 -0.54 0.92 
Family Background        
Neighborhood Mean Household Income ($1,000) a 4,421 46.63 22.84  1,380 47.02 22.68 
Awarded Private School        
Count of Voucher Students 3,618 130.13 99.35  1,150 128.91 92.92 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) b 3,601 73.81 33.04  1,150 73.68 33.26 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 3,601 5.41 1.67  1,150 5.21 1.59 
Distance to Home (mile) 3,585 5.19 5.97   1,144 5.21 6.15 
Community Educational Resources c        
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000) 2,314 12.61 3.82  751 12.70 4.02 
Count of Charter School 2,353 2.67 3.24  767 2.30 2.95 
District Minority Enrollment (%) 2,340 73.19 20.73  754 72.36 20.50 
Notes: Counts based on non-kindergarten students who were awarded LSP vouchers in the year 2012-13, with and 
without restricting the sample to students in grades 3 through 5 in 2012. a SOURCE: IRS, Statistics of Income 
Division, Individual Master File System, July 2014. b SOURCE: PSS Private School Universe Survey data 2012-13 
and 2013-2014 school year. c SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics 
Common Core of Data (CCD) “Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey” 2012-13 v.1a. 
 
Since not all voucher-using students in our sample have test scores and associated 
schooling information, we categorize our sample into two groups by restricting it to students in 
grades 3 through 5 during the 2011-12 baseline year or not. Students in grades 3 through 5 in 
2011-12 do not pass the 8th grade during the three academic years following the baseline year. 
Thus, we have full information regarding their educational backgrounds including baseline test 
scores, outcome year test scores, and the associated schooling information. By restricting the 
analytical sample to only students in grades 3 through 5 in the baseline year, we are able to 
essentially eliminate the transition to high school as a possible explanation for moving to the 
public sector (Cowen et al., 2012). As a result, the overall sample comprises 4,426 voucher-using 
students, and the restricted sample includes 1,382 of those students. Descriptive statistics of the 
average student characteristics in these two analytical samples are mostly similar. The only 
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exception is that we have only elementary students in the restricted sample, so it differs from the 
unrestricted sample regarding grade level. 
Analytical Strategy 
This study focuses on student participation during the first three years in the LSP. Who 
applied for the LSP initially? How do student backgrounds predict voucher decliners and users? 
What characteristics are associated with voucher attrition? Addressing these key research 
questions, we first compare the characteristics of families and students who applied for the 
program to those who did not, then compare the characteristics of families and students who 
declined vouchers to those who accepted them, and lastly compare the characteristics of families 
and voucher students who switch to public schools to those who remain. In this section, we make 
those comparisons for each factor while controlling for the effects of all the other factors on 
student usage patterns. Since our study focuses on students’ post-lottery behaviors, this study is 
purely observational in design.  
Voucher application 
We first predict who applied for the voucher program. Student Information System (SIS) 
files recorded 695,812 students attending Louisiana public schools in the 2011 school year, of 
which 6,052 students applied to and were deemed eligible for the LSP.  
We employ a Probit regression to estimate how students’ backgrounds predict their LSP 
application (𝑦1) with the value “1” indicating applicants and “0” for non-applicants. The 
decision of whether to apply or not apply for an LSP voucher is treated as a function of a latent 
variable, 𝑌1
∗, which is a linear function of student demographics. If this latent variable’s value is 
above a certain threshold, say 0, the student decides to apply. If it is below that threshold, the 
student does not apply. Specifically, we model 𝑌1
∗ and 𝑦1 as: 
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𝑦1 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌1
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌1
∗ ≤ 0
     (1) 
𝑌1
∗ = 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐  (2) 
Ideally the vector student would include a rich set of covariates. Unfortunately, due to data 
limitations, we are only able to compare basic student demographics between the two groups 
including gender, race, and Free/Reduced Price Lunch Program status.  The non-applicant group 
includes both eligible and non-eligible students in order to test the extent to which the eligibility 
requirements of the program succeeded in targeting disadvantaged students.  
Voucher usage 
For the second research question, we are interested in students who were unable or 
unwilling to use the voucher when offered: the decliners. As summarized in Table 1, 3,865 of 
4,426 LSP awardees have used the voucher to attend a private school during the 2012-13 to 
2014-15 school years. The overall take-up rate for the first cohort non-kindergarten voucher-
awarded students is 87.3%, indicating only one-eighth of students had never used a voucher-
supported placement during the first three years of the LSP. This take-up rate is higher than other 
lottery-based voucher programs nationwide (Cowen, 2010; Wolf, Eissa, & Gutmann, 2006; 
Howell, 2004;). The fact that students were simultaneously offered a voucher and placement in a 
specific preferred private school likely contributed to this high take-up rate (Abdulkadiroğlu, 
Pathak, & Roth, 2005; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005). The voucher take-up rate for the restricted 
sample is 86.6%, which is not significantly different from the overall sample rate.  
To account for the independent influence of specific student characteristics and 
educational background factors on the decliner decision, we use a Probit regression to estimate 
the effect of student background on parent behavior (𝑦2) of taking (1) or declining (0) the 
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voucher after initially receiving a voucher placement offer. The decision of whether to use or not 
use an LSP voucher is treated as a function of a latent variable, 𝑌2
∗, which is a linear function of 
student demographics(𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖), characteristics of the private schools’ students were placed to 
(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖), residential school district educational resources (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖), institutional 
characteristics of previously attended public schools (𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖). If this latent variable’s 
value is above a certain threshold, say 0, the student decides to use. If it is below that threshold, 
the student does not to use. Specifically, we model 𝑌2
∗ and 𝑦2 as: 
𝑦2 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌2
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌2
∗ ≤ 0
     (3) 
𝑌2
∗ = 𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜷 + 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜸 + 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜹 + 𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐  (4) 
Robust standard errors account for clustering of students within assigned private schools to 
account for spatial auto-correlation due to students placed in the same private school having the 
same private school characteristics and similar community educational resources. 
School movement 
Student school movement after attending the private school is another major outcome of 
interest in our study. We use the “leavers” to refer to voucher users who left the program after 
initially attending one at any time during the program. The leavers comprise two groups of 
students: those who went back to the public-school system and are recorded as enrolled in one 
public school in the SIS as public school returnees, and those who switched to another private 
school without using a voucher or who left Louisiana and thus are untraceable in the SIS.6 In our 
study, we focus both on the general leavers as well as the specific public school returnees.  
                                                 
6
 A student who switches to another LSP participating private school and continues to use his or her voucher is still 
identified as a “stayer” because the student has not left the program. If a voucher-using student switches to a non-
LSP private school he or she will be coded as a “leaver” as his or her enrollment is not recorded in the SIS.   
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Since student sector switching occurs across all three school years, student decisions 
regarding usage are best captured by a longitudinal decision-making model. We statistically 
model the patterns of student “survival” in the voucher program in the face of the “risk” that 
students will suffer the “hazard” of leaving the program during certain time periods.  Students 
who leave the program at a specific point are not exposed to the risk of re-exiting the program at 
a later time. As a result, survival models are especially appropriate to estimate what kind of and 
to what extent the students’ backgrounds influence their decisions regarding switching back to 
public schools during the school year 2012-13 through 2014-15 (Cox, & Reid, 1984, 1-5). 
We first estimate the unconditional hazard of switching sectors. Assuming the student 
using a voucher to attend a private school is exposed to the risk of exiting the program at a rate 
of: 
h(𝑡𝑖𝑗) = Pr(T𝑖 = j|T𝑖 ≥ j)     (5) 
where h(t) is the hazard rate of a voucher-using student leaving the program at the time j 
conditional on remaining in the private school before time j. Once the student makes a cross-
section movement in year j, the student will no longer be considered to be at risk. On average, 
the hazard function ℎ̂(𝑡) of leaving the program in period j is calculated as: 
ℎ̂(𝑡𝑗) =
𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗 
𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗
      (6) 
Where 𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗 refers to the number of students who left the program during year j and 
𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗 represents the number of students remaining in private schools at the beginning of 
year j (Singer & Willett, 2003, p.332).  
 We first estimate the unconditional hazard of voucher usage in fiscal quarters during 
school years 2012-13 to 2014-2015 and graph the probability of staying in the voucher-accepting 
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private schools as a Kaplan-Meier survival function in Figure 1. The figure clearly shows that the 
probability of staying in the LSP private schools decreases steadily during the 3-year time period 
in our study, with the biggest drops during summer sessions, between Quarter 4 of one fiscal 
year (April through June) and Quarter 1 of the next fiscal year (July through September). We 
further code student LSP annual voucher usage, focusing on the fall semester usage in Quarter 2 
(October through December) of each school year. Any student observed as a “voucher user” in 
Quarter 2 of year t while not observed as a user in Quarter 2 of year t+1 is recognized as a leaver 
in year t. 
The hazard rate of annual-leaving among the original voucher users is presented in Table 
4, including the count of students remaining in private schools at the beginning of each school 
year in Column 1 (𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗), and the count of students who left the program during each school 
year (Column 2). Hazard rates for users leaving LSP private schools in each year (Column 3) are 
obtained from Equation 4, and the cumulative Survivor Function (Column 4) is the proportion of 
students who remain in private schools accounting for the overall voucher users. Hazard rates of 
voucher-using students leaving the program are estimated for the overall sample and for the 
restricted sample, separately. We count leavers by school movement type in Columns 5 and 6. 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities, school year 2012-13 through 2014-15, in fiscal 
year quarters. 
 
Table 4 
 
Life Table Describing the Count of Students Remaining in their Private School of Choice 
 
Beginning 
Total 
(1) 
Leaver 
(2) 
Hazard 
Ratio 
(3) 
Survivor 
Function 
(4) 
Switched 
to Public 
Schools 
(5) 
Moved to Other Private 
Schools without Using 
Voucher or Left 
Louisiana Entirely 
(6) Time 
Overall Sample (N=3,865)       
School Year 2012-13 3,861 1003 0.260 0.740 860 143 
School Year 2013-14 2,858 572 0.200 0.592 463 109 
School Year 2014-15 2,286 617 0.270 0.481 453 164 
Students in Grades 3 through 
 5 (2012) (N= 1,197)   
  
School Year 2012-13 1,196 318 0.266 0.734 272 46 
School Year 2013-14 878 166 0.189 0.595 133 30 
School Year 2014-15 712 185 0.260 0.449 175 10 
Notes: Counts are based on non-kindergarten students who have ever used LSP vouchers during the 2012-13 to 
2014-15 school year, with and without restricting the sample to students in grades 3 through 5 at the baseline school 
year 2012-13. Usage status is obtained from the applicant file and the school movement status are obtained from SIS 
2012-13 through 2015-16.  
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There are three important patterns of LSP participants’ post-lottery movements. First, a 
majority of students have changed school section during the years observed. By the end of the 
third year, 48% of voucher users remain in the program, resulting in an overall annual attrition 
rate of about 24%, accounting for 52% attrition cumulatively over three years. This voucher 
leaver rate is similar to the MPCP’s 22% to 35% every year (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al., 2012; 
Carlson et al., 2013) and the New York City school choice program’s 22% (Howell, 2004). 
Second, school switchers are more likely to return to Louisiana public schools than to leave the 
state public school system entirely. Among voucher users, nearly 74% of them continued 
attending the private school of choice through the first year, and about 86% of voucher leavers, 
accounting for 860 students, switched back to public schools by the end of school year 2012-13 
(Column 5). The public school return rate was 81% of voucher-program leavers for school year 
2013-14 and 73% of voucher-program leavers for school year 2014-15. Lastly, the hazard and 
survival trends between the full sample and restricted sample are nearly identical. This result 
indicates that the restricted sample has the same attrition patterns as the full sample and is 
representative of the overall sample in terms of program attrition rate, even though it is restricted 
to students who started in the elementary grades of 3 through 5.  
We first use the Cox Proportional Hazards Model to predict LSP leavers by school year: 
ℎ̂(𝑡𝑗) = exp (𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜷 + 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜸 + 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒊
′. 𝜹 + 𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝑺𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒍𝒊
′. 𝜽     (7) 
Where voucher using student i’s hazard rate of leaving the LSP private school at year j is 
estimated as a function of his or her individual characteristics (𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖), characteristics of the 
private school the student was placed in (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖), residential school district educational 
resources (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖), and institutional characteristics of their previously attended public 
school (𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖). These measures are the same as in Equation 2. To account for spatial 
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auto-correlation due to students placed in the same private school having the same private school 
characteristics and similar community educational resources, robust standard errors are clustered 
at assigned private school. 
More than one event is considered a “failure” of remaining in private schools. A student 
who used a voucher previously could revert to a Louisiana public school or leave the Louisiana 
public school system entirely. Therefore, we estimate Competing Risk Regressions, which 
predict the probability of exiting the LSP voucher program while simultaneously accounting for 
the probability of leaving the Louisiana public school system entirely (Cowen et al., 2012). 
The hazard ratios in both Cox Proportional Hazard Models and Competing-risk 
Regressions hazard ratios 𝛽𝑖 are not interpreted in the same manner as coefficients in multiple 
linear regressions. Since the model is in exponential form, a variable with a hazard ratio larger 
than 1 should be interpreted as having a higher probability of experiencing the hazard of leaving 
the private school, while a variable with a hazard ratio smaller than 1 should be interpreted as 
having a lower probability of experiencing that hazard. 
Results 
In this section, we present the estimated results on the characteristics that differentiate the 
voucher applicants from their non-applicant counterparts (Table 5), on characteristics that 
differentiate the voucher decliners from their voucher-using counterparts (Table 6), and on 
characteristics differentiating the voucher using students who left LSP private schools from the 
ones who remained in private schools (Table 7 and Table 8), during the first three years of the 
expansion of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (school years 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15).  
Results in Tables 6 through 8 are presented using the full sample and the restricted 
sample, separately. Moreover, we conduct the estimation using the restricted sample with and 
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without controlling for student test scores and associated educational backgrounds, separately. 
Model 3 in Table 6 and Models 3 through 5 in Table 7 and 8 are our preferred models for 
interpretation. 
Who applies? 
 Table 5 presents the estimated marginal effects of the student demographics on LSP 
application. Results reveal that African American and Hispanic students, as well as students 
enrolled in the Free/Reduced Price Lunch Program have a significantly higher likelihood of 
applying for the voucher (p<.01). This pattern indicates that LSP applicants are more 
disadvantaged than their public school student peers. Students in lower grades show a higher 
likelihood of applying for the voucher than their higher grade peers (p<.01). 
 
Table 5 
 
Predicting Voucher Applicants 
 (1) 
  
Baseline Grade Level -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Female 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Free/Reduced Price Lunch Program 0.007*** 
 (0.000) 
African American 0.014*** 
 (0.000) 
Hispanic 0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
  
Observations 637,629 
Significance level * p<0.10, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
Notes: Estimates are average marginal effects after Probit regressions. The dependent variable equals 1 if a student 
applied for the LSP in 2012. 
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Who declines? 
Table 6 presents the estimated marginal effects of the student individual characteristics 
and educational backgrounds on the students’ decisions to decline vouchers. Our primary results 
of Model 3, which focuses only on students in grades 3 through 5 at the baseline year, provide 
little evidence that LSP participating private schools have “cream skimmed” more advantaged 
students. The Probit model reveals no significant differences between voucher decliners and 
users in terms of student gender, ethnicity, family background, and baseline test scores. Students 
with a special educational need tend to have a higher likelihood of declining the voucher 
(p<.10). These results are consistent across all model specifications. 
Students who are more committed to the program tend to be less likely to decline the 
voucher. In Models 1 and 2, without controlling for student educational backgrounds, students 
who had participated in the New Orleans Pilot Program are predicted to be about 12% less likely 
to decline a voucher when offered. This effect fades out after controlling for student educational 
backgrounds. Meanwhile, students assigned to their first-choice schools tend to be less likely to 
decline the assigned private school, consistent across all model specifications (p<.05). 
The awarded private schools’ attributes tend to play a more important role than student 
characteristics in voucher usage decision making. All else being equal, students who were 
lottery-placed in private schools with lower tuition rates are more likely to decline the voucher: a 
$1,000 increase in school tuition is associated with a 2-to-5 percentage points reduction in the 
likelihood of declining a voucher, all else being equal, significant at p<.01. As school tuition 
rates tend to be positively correlated with school quality, it is unsurprising that families awarded 
voucher placements in higher quality private schools are more likely to use them at the assigned 
schools. Another significant private school predictor of declining is the distance between the 
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awarded private school and a student’s home, as a one-mile increase in the home-to-school 
distance is associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of declining the 
voucher, all else being equal, significant at the .05 level. This result is reasonable given the 
burden of long school commutes. Furthermore, students assigned to private schools with higher 
proportions of minority students are more likely to decline the voucher, at the .01 level of 
significance. These preference patterns are consistent across all model specifications for the 
restricted and full LSP samples. 
Notably, students with better educational alternatives have a higher tendency to decline 
the awarded voucher. Controlling for other factors, students living in school districts with higher 
educational expenditures and more charter schools are more likely to decline their LSP 
placements, significant at the .01 and .05 level, respectively. 
Lastly, students who have attended charter schools have a higher tendency to decline the 
voucher, while students who attended magnet schools in 2011-12 have a lower tendency to 
decline. Students enrolled in charter schools in the baseline year 2011-12 on average are 9.6 
percentage points more likely to decline awarded vouchers, compared to their peers from TPSs 
(p<.05). Students enrolled in magnet schools in 2011-12 are 11 percentage points less likely to 
decline awarded vouchers, compared to their peers from TPSs (p<.05). These results could be 
due to the families of children who have attended public charter schools being more comfortable 
staying in public schools while the families of children who have attended public magnet schools 
and TPSs are more willing to make the jump to unfamiliar private school environments.  
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Table 6 
 
Predicting Voucher Decliners 
 Overall Sample  Students in Grades 3 through 5 (2012) 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Student Characteristics            
Female -0.014 (0.013)  -0.013 (0.019)  -0.036 
 
(0.031) 
African American 0.026 (0.025)  -0.008 (0.034)  0.011 
 
(0.047) 
Hispanic -0.080 (0.056)     
  
Special Education Need 0.043 ** (0.021)  0.058 * (0.032)  0.083 * (0.046) 
Baseline Grade Level 0.004 (0.003)  -0.011 (0.013)  -0.010 
 
(0.019) 
Multiple Birth Siblings  0.011 (0.036)  0.106 (0.077)  0.069 
 
(0.096) 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income ($1,000) 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.001 
 
(0.001) 
NOLA Participant -0.124 *** (0.030)  -0.129 *** (0.039)  -0.059 
 
(0.152) 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School -0.101 *** (0.020)  -0.065 ** (0.035)  -0.122 *** (0.044) 
Baseline Achievement Score       0.009 
 
(0.020) 
Awarded Private School       
  
Count of Voucher Students 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 0.001 *** (0.000)  0.001 *** (0.000)  0.001 ** (0.001) 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) -0.013 (0.009)  -0.022 *** (0.007)  -0.045 *** (0.012) 
Distance to Home (mile) 0.004 *** (0.001)  0.005 *** (0.001)  0.006 ** (0.002) 
Community Educational Resources         
  
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000)         0.011 ** (0.005) 
Count of Charter School         0.020 *** (0.007) 
District Minority Enrollment (%)         -0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Previously Attended Public School         
  
Charter School         0.096 ** (0.051) 
Magnet School         -0.106 ** (0.048) 
            
Observations 3585    1116    581 
  
Significance level * p<0.10, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
Notes: Estimates are average marginal effects after Probit regressions. The dependent variable equals 1 if a student has ever declined a voucher after initially 
being offered one. Model 1 presents estimates using the full sample and Models 2 and 3 are estimations for the restricted sample. Hispanic is omitted in Models 2 
and 3 due to low numbers of students in that ethnicity category. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses and are clustered at the lottery-assigned private 
schools.  
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With the important exception of a disability, student characteristics, including baseline 
test scores, are not predictive of declining an LSP voucher placement. Families more committed 
to the LSP due to prior experience in the Pilot program tend to be less likely to decline the 
voucher. Additionally, students assigned to private schools with lower tuition costs (lower 
quality), students who have better alternatives, and students who previously attended charter 
schools, are all more likely to decline the LSP when offered. Voucher decliners are not likely to 
be more disadvantaged, either educationally or economically, than their voucher user 
counterparts, except regarding having a disability. These results are less consistent with a 
hypothesis that private schools are “cream skimming” certain students into the program as they 
are with the claim that students are voluntarily deciding whether or not to participate in the LSP 
based on their commitment to this program and their educational alternatives. 
Who left LSP private schools? 
Previous research suggests that students who feel socially alienated and families who 
cannot manage the logistics and demands of a private school education may opt out from 
attending voucher-participating private schools (Stewart & Wolf, 2014; Howell, 2004). These 
students are more likely to come from disadvantaged families.  
To test if schools tend to push certain students out of the program, we model the 
relationship among students, residential school districts, and the attending private schools, all 
while accounting for the passage of time, using a Cox Hazards Model. We condition the voucher 
usage every year on the same student, family, and school characteristics discussed previously. 
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Table 7  reports estimates of Equation 7, where each reported coefficient is the associated 
hazard ratio for each factor of leaving the LSP program. Like odds ratios in logit regressions, 
hazard ratios should be interpreted as exponentiated coefficients: coefficients greater than 1 
indicate increases in the likelihood of a student leaving the voucher program, while coefficients 
less than 1 indicate decreases in the likelihood of a student leaving the program.7 
We first provide the estimated effects of student demographics and the characteristics of 
the private school attended on the hazard of leaving the LSP, based on the full sample (Model 1) 
and the restricted sample (Model 2). We then include student educational background factors 
along with test scores in three specifications based on the restricted sample: with baseline math 
test score Testt0 only (Model 3), math test score the year the student might leave Testt (Model 4), 
and math test gain score from the previous year to the year the student might leave Testt -Testt-1 
(Model 5).  
Several important trends are clear. First, student test scores influence the decision 
regarding whether or not to leave the private school a student is attending through the LSP. 
Students with lower baseline test scores show a higher probability of leaving the LSP private 
school after accounting for their demographics and educational backgrounds. This finding aligns 
with previous studies (Rouse, 1998; Cowen et al., 2012; Carlson et al., 2013; Figlio et al., 2014). 
The effects of the most recent student achievement score and gain score on student leaving 
decisions each year are not significantly different from zero after controlling for student 
demographics and baseline achievement. That is, there is little evidence that the LSP is pushing 
out students with lower academic performance experienced while in their chosen private schools. 
                                                 
7
 Hazard ratios always are positive numbers. 
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Second, only a couple of student demographics show consistent effects on the hazard of 
leaving the LSP private school. Male and higher-grade voucher-using students are more likely to 
leave, significant at the .10 and .01 level, respectively, for both the full LSP sample and the 
restricted sample. Students with a disability tend to leave the private school at a higher rate, yet 
this effect is only significant for the overall sample (p<.10) which includes a larger group of 
students with special needs than the restricted sample. The effects of gender, disability status, 
and grade level on leaving behavior are consistent with previous studies (Carlson et al., 2013; 
Howell, 2004; Rouse, 1998).  
Pilot program participants tend to face a lower risk of returning to public schools. The 
hazard ratio for having previously participated in the New Orleans Pilot Program is smaller than 
1 across all model specifications, and is statistically significant when only accounting for student 
background factors and the characteristics of assigned private schools, indicating those students 
tend to have significantly lower tendencies of leaving the private schools they are attending 
through the program. After including student test scores and educational backgrounds, students 
who were awarded their first-choice schools face a significantly greater risk of leaving the 
private school of choice (p<.01), which is contrary to our expectation. 
Characteristics of voucher-assigned private schools show a more consistent and 
significant effect on the hazards of leaving the LSP than do most student characteristics. When 
accounting for only student demographics, students in private schools with higher tuition tend to 
have a lower likelihood of leaving the LSP, significant at the .10 level, for both the full and 
restricted samples. This potential school quality effect fades out after controlling for student test 
scores and other educational background factors. Students who attend LSP private schools with 
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higher proportions of minority students and who face longer school commutes have a greater risk 
of leaving the LSP. These patterns hold across all model specifications. 
Finally, the effects of students’ residential community educational resources and whether 
or not they previously attended a public school are not significantly associated with the hazard of 
leaving the LSP, all else being equal, with the exception that a higher residential district’s per-
pupil educational expenditure predicts a higher likelihood of leaving the LSP after initial 
enrollment.  
In sum, males, students in higher grades, and students who did not attend the Pilot 
program face greater risks of exiting the private school that they are attending through the LSP. 
There is no consistent evidence that the LSP is “pushing out” demographically more 
disadvantaged students. Meanwhile, accounting for student demographics, voucher-using 
students with lower baseline achievement, those in private schools with a higher proportion of 
minority students and farther from home all tend to be more likely to leave the LSP. Students 
residing in districts with a higher educational per-pupil expenditure tend to leave the LSP at a 
higher rate, perhaps attracted by the greater resources in the public schools. 
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Table 7  
 
Predicting Leaving the LSP, Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
 Overall 
Sample 
 Students in Grades 3 through 5 (2012) 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Student Characteristics       
 Female 0.883**  0.806*** 0.881 0.856* 0.860* 
 (0.046)  (0.067) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) 
African American 1.072  1.01 0.991 0.970 0.998 
 (0.100)  (0.122) (0.131) (0.143) (0.145) 
Hispanic 0.863  1.335 1.465 1.379 1.403 
 (0.167)  (0.313) (0.376) (0.390) (0.391) 
Special Education Need 1.172*  1.129 1.028 1.149 1.225 
 (0.111)  (0.175) (0.177) (0.199) (0.206) 
Baseline Grade Level 1.110***  1.293*** 1.180*** 1.186*** 1.177*** 
 (0.016)  (0.059) (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) 
Multiple Birth Siblings  0.896  1.132 1.29 1.311 1.328 
 (0.149)  (0.156) (0.298) (0.337) (0.330) 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income 
($1,000) 0.999  1.002 0.996 0.995 0.995 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
NOLA  0.668***  0.732*** 0.539 0.642 0.630 
 (0.070)  (0.074) (0.320) (0.394) (0.390) 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School 1.095  1.234 1.790*** 1.786*** 1.717*** 
 (0.111)  (0.192) (0.361) (0.359) (0.348) 
Achievement       
Test t0    0.910**   
    (0.036)   
Test t     0.975  
     (0.027)  
Test t -Test t-1      1.005 
      (0.027) 
(Continued) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Significance level *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
Notes: Cox Proportional Hazard Models are performed, defining the hazard as 1 if a student left the LSP at year t. 
Model 1 presents estimates using the full sample while Models 2 through 5 are estimations for the restricted sample. 
Estimates are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses and are clustered at the lottery-assigned 
private school.  
 
Who returned to public schools? 
The leavers comprise two groups of students: those who stopped using the voucher to 
attend LSP private schools because they chose to return to the public school system, and those 
who left the program because they had to, for both structural reasons (e.g. graduated) and non-
structural reasons (e.g. moved out of state) and no longer trackable in the Student Information 
System. Since those two groups of leavers are based on a different logic, we further conduct a 
robustness check of factors predicting LSP students returning to public schools using 
Competing-risk Regressions. In these estimations, each reported coefficient is the associated 
 Overall 
Sample 
 Students in Grades 3 through 5 (2012) 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Awarded Private School       
Count of Voucher Students 0.999  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 1.005***  1.005*** 1.006*** 1.006** 1.006** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 0.921*  0.911* 0.905 0.910 0.918 
 (0.043)  (0.046) (0.059) (0.068) (0.068) 
Distance to Home (mile) 1.010**  1.021*** 1.021*** 1.020** 1.021** 
 (0.005)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Community Educational Resources       
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000)    1.031** 1.030** 1.027* 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Count of Charter School    1.004 1.004 1.005 
    (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
District Minority Enrollment (%)    0.994 0.995 0.994 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Previously Attended School       
Charter School    1.307 1.179 1.189 
    (0.291) (0.269) (0.276) 
Magnet School    0.877 0.874 0.882 
    (0.141) (0.150) (0.148) 
       
Observations 7,175  2,212 1,080 1056 1045 
N Leavers 1,732  613 347 359 359 
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hazard ratio of switching to public schools for each factor, with the competing possibility of 
switching to another private school without using the voucher or leaving the state.  
Table 8 presents the estimations from Competing-risk Regressions. As is the case for LSP 
leavers generally, recent math achievement and achievement gains are not predictive of students 
returning to public schools in school years 2012-13 through 2014-15. Student demographics 
perform similar roles as they do in predicting LSP leavers, as males and higher-grade voucher-
using students face higher risks of switching to public schools for the full sample (p<.05), yet 
these effects fade out in the restricted sample. African American and Hispanic students tend to 
face a higher risk of switching to public schools in the full LSP sample; however, the result is 
only statistically significant in some of the model specifications. As was the case in predicting 
LSP leavers, students who attended the Pilot program tend to have a significantly lower 
likelihood of switching to public schools (p<.01), significant only when controlling for student 
demographics and characteristics of attending private schools. Still, students who were awarded 
their first-choice schools tend to leave them at a higher rate (p<.01). 
Characteristics of voucher-assigned private schools show a consistent and significant 
effect on the hazards of returning to public schools. Students in private schools with higher 
proportions of minority students and schools located farther from home are at greater risk of 
switching to public schools. These patterns hold across all model specifications. 
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Table 8  
 
Predicting Switching to Public Schools, Competing Hazard Model 
 Overall 
Sample 
 Students in Grades 3 through 5 (2012) 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Student Characteristics       
 Female 0.851***  0.820** 0.891 0.839* 0.854 
 (0.039)  (0.065) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086) 
African American 1.322**  1.280 1.315 1.361 1.346 
 (0.165)  (0.204) (0.261) (0.284) (0.274) 
Hispanic 0.920  1.652* 1.658 1.843* 1.821* 
 (0.217)  (0.479) (0.546) (0.599) (0.580) 
Special Education Need 1.041  1.048 0.889 0.982 1.025 
 (0.129)  (0.218) (0.205) (0.228) (0.237) 
Baseline Grade Level 1.058***  1.222*** 1.131* 1.125* 1.120* 
 (0.021)  (0.060) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071) 
Multiple Birth Siblings  0.955  1.071 1.243 1.256 1.228 
 (0.172)  (0.278) (0.356) (0.382) (0.378) 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income 
($1,000) 
0.999  1.000 0.993** 0.992** 0.992** 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
NOLA  0.601***  0.623*** 0.638 0.731 0.697 
 (0.064)  (0.075) (0.403) (0.488) (0.465) 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School 1.093  1.539** 2.113*** 2.183*** 2.108*** 
 (0.120)  (0.299) (0.549) (0.539) (0.542) 
Achievement       
Test t0    0.912   
    (0.052)   
Test t     0.965  
     (0.064)  
Test t -Test t-1      1.086 
      (0.069) 
(Continued) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Significance level *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
Notes: Competing-risk Hazards Models are performed, defining failure as 1 if a student left the LSP private school 
at year t and state competing as 1 if a student is untraceable at the current year. Model 1 presents estimates using the 
full sample, Models 2 through 5 are estimations for the restricted sample. Estimates are hazard ratios. Robust 
standard errors appear in parentheses and are clustered at the lottery assigned private school.  
 
Who stays? 
Given that the LSP applicants were negatively self-selected but the voucher users were 
positively selected, we pose the last question: in the end, how are the persistent LSP users 
different from their non-applicant peers demographically? 
Table 9 presents the demographic comparisons between the LSP non-applicants and the 
year 3 users who were in a public school prior to applying to the program. T-test results reveal 
that even the persistent users were negatively self-selected, meaning that they are more 
disadvantaged than their non-applicant peers. Year 3 LSP voucher users are 25 percentage points 
 Overall 
Sample 
 Students in Grade 3 through 5 (2012) 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Awarded Private School       
Count of Voucher Students 0.999  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) 1.003*  1.004** 1.005** 1.005** 1.005** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) 0.959  0.968 0.976 0.990 0.991 
 (0.036)  (0.026) (0.047) (0.049) (0.050) 
Distance to Home (mile) 1.003  1.021*** 1.021** 1.022** 1.022** 
 (0.007)  (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Community Educational Resources       
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000)    1.012 1.008 1.016 
    (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) 
Count of Charter School    1.020 1.020 1.025 
    (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
District Minority Enrollment (%)    0.994 0.994 0.992* 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Previously Attended School       
Charter School    1.084 1.047 1.081 
    (0.233) (0.256) (0.271) 
Magnet School    0.952 0.955 0.967 
    (0.187) (0.196) (0.199) 
       
Observations 7,179  2,213 1,081 1,057 1,045 
N Leavers 1,378  481 288 276 273 
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more likely to receive Free/Reduced Price Lunch and 35 percentage points more likely to be 
African American compared to the non-applicants. Year 3 voucher users also are more likely to 
be female than are their non-applicant peers. 
Table 9 
 
Student Demographic Differences between Non-Applicants and Year 3 Users 
 
Year 3 Users Mean 
(N=955) 
Non-Applicants Mean 
(N=695,812) Diff  
Grade Level (2012) 3.541 6.226 -2.686 *** 
Female 0.532 0.487 0.045 *** 
Free/Reduced Price Lunch Program 0.917 0.668 0.249 *** 
African American 0.798 0.448 0.350 *** 
Hispanic 0.040 0.041 -0.001  
White 0.147 0.476 -0.329 *** 
Significance level *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01, two tail t-test. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study investigates the participation patterns in the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
during the first three years after the program expanded statewide (school years 2012-13, 2013-
14, and 2014-15). The LSP is one of the nation’s first statewide voucher programs for low-
income students and is based on lottery placement while accounting for an applicant’s portfolio 
of preferred private schools. The data we use in this study to examine application include all K-
12 public school students in Louisiana and all eligible applicants to the LSP. The data we use to 
examine patterns of voucher use include all LSP non-kindergarten awardees. The 
comprehensiveness of our data gives the study high external validity at the state level. However, 
student enrollment status at the end of school year 2014-15 is not available, so our analysis 
predicting public school returnees is restricted to the 2012-13 and 2013-14 school years. Further, 
we do not have a direct measure of family income or family social-economic status. The measure 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income can only offer indirect information about variation in 
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family financial resources, and its effects are not consistently predictive of student movement 
among schools.  
A simple description confirms that the LSP successfully reached its targeted population 
of students. We find a comparatively high take-up rate (87.3 %) and a relatively low attrition rate 
(24% regarding the original sample annually) during the first three years among the non-
kindergarten students who were offered voucher placements. This high take-up and continuation 
rate indicates a higher parental satisfaction for the assigned schools, even though their children 
experienced smaller test-score gains than their peers who lost the placement lotteries (Mills & 
Wolf, 2019; Mills & Wolf, 2017).  
Little evidence of school “cream skimming” of high-achieving students was found. Table 
10 summarizes the effect of student characteristics in predicting LSP application, initial 
declining, and leaving later on (including students who left the program in general and returned 
to the public school system). We find that the LSP attracted a more disadvantaged student 
population to apply. We see little evidence of school “cream skimming” based on student 
demographics, as gender, ethnicity, and grade level are not predictive of initial voucher 
declining. Students with disabilities, however, have a higher tendency of declining a voucher. 
Our data do not allow us to determine if students with disabilities were discouraged from 
enrolling in an LSP school by school personnel or if those particular students simply viewed 
private school environments and offerings as less attractive for them compared to what is 
available for students with disabilities in public schools. There is some evidence that males and 
higher-grade students leave the LSP and return to the public sector at higher rates than females 
and lower-grade students do.   
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Table 10 
 
Summary of Effects of Student Characteristics in Predicting LSP Participation 
 
Initial Application 
(vs. non-applicants) 
 Initial Declining 
(vs. ever users) 
Leaving 
(vs. persisting) 
Returning to 
Public School 
(vs. persisting) 
Year 3 Users 
(vs. non-applicants) 
Student Characteristics       
 Free/Reduced Price Lunch Program +***  N/A N/A N/A  +*** 
Female    - *  +*** 
African American +***     +*** 
Hispanic +***    + *  
Special Education Need N/A  + *   N/A 
Baseline Grade Level      - ***   +  *** +  *  - *** 
Multiple Birth Siblings  N/A     N/A 
Neighborhood Mean Household Income ($1,000) N/A    - ** N/A 
NOLA Participant N/A  - ***   N/A 
Awarded LSP to 1st Choice School N/A   + *** + * N/A 
Baseline Achievement Score N/A   - **  N/A 
Awarded Private School       
Count of Voucher Students N/A     N/A 
Private School Minority Enrollment (%) N/A  + ** + ** + ** N/A 
Tuition Rate ($1,000) N/A  - ***   N/A 
Distance to Home (mile) N/A  + ** + ** + ** N/A 
Community Educational Resources       
Per-pupil Expenditure ($1,000) N/A  + ** + **  N/A 
Count of Charter School N/A  + ***   N/A 
District Minority Enrollment (%) N/A    - * N/A 
Previously Attended Public School       
Charter School N/A  + **   N/A 
Magnet School N/A  - **   N/A 
Significance level * p<0.10, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  
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Student test scores do not predict initial voucher usage. Lower achieving students at the 
baseline year tend to leave the program at a higher rate in later years; however, this pattern is not 
significantly predictive for those who switched back to public schools. Other measures of student 
achievement while at LSP private schools, including student achievement scores and gain scores, 
are not predictive of LSP attrition. These patterns should allay concerns of selection bias in 
interpreting the LSP’s Treatment-On-Treated effects on student test scores in the longitudinal 
evaluation (Mills & Wolf, 2019; Mills & Wolf, 2017b; Mills and Wolf, 2017a; Mills & Wolf, 
2016; Mills, 2015). The lottery winners who opted out of the LSP by either declining the offered 
voucher or by leaving the program later on are, on average, not lower achieving students than the 
program stayers.  
Families with higher commitment to the program, as measured by having previously 
attended the New Orleans Pilot Program, show higher tendencies of both using the voucher and 
remaining in LSP private schools (full sample only). LSP applicants who were awarded the 
voucher for first-choice schools are more likely to use the voucher initially but tend to leave the 
program and return to the public sector in later years at a higher rate. 
Students assigned to private schools with a larger proportion of minority students, and 
with farther distances between home and school, tend to be more likely to decline the voucher 
and to leave the LSP and switch to public schools later on. Meanwhile, students residing in better 
educationally funded districts with more schooling alternatives have a higher tendency of both 
declining the voucher and leaving the LSP after initially attending LSP private schools. These 
results are all consistent with families carefully evaluating their specific school choices.  
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At the end, even students who persisted through three years of LSP voucher use tend to 
be negatively self-selected. Year 3 LSP users are more disadvantaged, demographically, than 
their public school student peers. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on student participation patterns in 
publicly funded voucher programs. Previous studies of those patterns in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice and the New York City school choice programs show that disadvantaged students were 
disproportionately attracted to the programs but also were more likely to refuse to use the 
voucher when offered and to exit voucher programs early after initially using one. The higher 
tendency to reject a voucher or quit school choice programs for those students indicates they 
were struggling in their private school. Our study reveals, however, this pattern is not the case in 
the LSP: The applicants to the LSP were more disadvantaged demographically than the non-
applicants, yet students who declined to use a voucher and students who exited the program are 
not necessarily the most disadvantaged groups of students based on a variety of social, economic, 
and educational measures. There is little evidence that private schools participating in the LSP 
are “cream skimming” advantaged students based on their characteristics, with the important 
exception of students with disabilities, whom small private schools may not be able to attract, 
especially with the meager resources of a $5,000 per year LSP voucher.  
There is also no substantial evidence that private schools participating in the LSP “push 
out” disadvantaged students based on their characteristics and test score performance once 
enrolled. On the contrary, students tend to self-select themselves out of the program when they 
attend private schools with a greater share of minority enrollments, tend to have longer distances 
to travel from school to home, and tend to have better residential district educational resources. 
Since those factors also contribute to attrition rates in private schools regardless of voucher 
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programs, we cannot confirm if the attrition pattern is specifically due to the LSP or generally 
part of the nature of private schooling.  
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